

A Security Journey

Andreea Florescu, fandree@amazon.com



A Short Intro

- Virtualization components written in RustFocus on:
 - Quality vs Features
 - Extensibility and Usability
- Main customers: VMMs (e.g Cloud Hypervisor, Firecracker)



Components - Examples

- Hypervisor Support:
 - KVM -> kvm-ioctls & kvm-bindings
 - Microsoft Hyper-V -> mshv-ioctls & mshv-bindings
- Devices:
 - Serial Console, RTC -> vm-superio
 - MMIO Bus, PIO Bus, Device Managers
- Virtio:
 - Queues, Virtio Device -> vm-virtio
 - Vhost, Vhost User I2C, Vhost User Backend





Security Journey

RUST-VMN

- Applying security at multiple levels:
 - Organization Setup
 - Development
 - Documentation
 - Operating in production



Organization Setup

- Writing components in Rust
- One Rust package (crate) per component
- All components run the same set of tests (unit tests, build, linters)
- Audits for vulnerabilities in dependencies



Audit for Vulnerabilities

- cargo audit
 - Checks a Rust vulnerability database
 - Vulnerable versions of dependencies
- Dependency versions typically locked in Rust binaries
- Rust-vmm = library components => NO fixed dependencies
- Audit checks MUST be run in consumer products



Development

- Reduced number of (external) dependencies
 - Common dependencies: libc, serde
 - 0-dependency components: vm-fdt, vm-superio, vm-device
- Negative testing
- Reduce the usage of unsafe code



Reduce Unsafe Code


- DON'TS:
 - Write everything in a big unsafe block
- DOs:
 - Limit the unsafe code
 - Document why it's safe/unsafe -> reduces the risk of code being misused



Documentation


- Document unsafe public functions -> required by Rust
- Threat model documentation:
 - Trusted/untrusted
 - Threats and mitigations
 - Document expectations from consumer products





Overly Simplified Operation Mode

- UART 16550A serial port with a 64-byte FIFO
- Receiving/Transmitting Data



Serial Console – Threat Model

Threat model available at rust-vmm/vm-superio

- 1. A malicious guest generates large memory allocations by flooding the serial console input:
 - CVE-2020-27173
 - Fix at the emulation level: limit input FIFO & return errors when FIFO full
 - Fix at the VMM level: handle FIFO full errors



Serial Console – Threat Model (2)

RUST-VMN

- 2. A malicious guest can fill up the host disk by generating a high amount of data to be written to the serial output.
 - Output in full control of the consumer
 - Mitigation only possible at the VMM level
 - Rate limit the output (e.g. ring buffer, named pipe)





Fuzzing Virtualization Components

- Component based fuzzing
- Advantages:
 - Fuzzing library code -> easy to pass input to target interface
 - Test components in isolation
 - Low level testing
- Disadvantage:
 - Testing side effects becomes harder
 - Identified issues might not reproduce
 - Mock driver code



Preparing Virtio Components for Fuzzing

RUST-VMN

- Identify the target interfaces:
 - Queues
 - Device Implementation (virtio-blk)
- Build reusable mock-ups:
 - Partially implemented as part of GSoC 2021
 - Create descriptor chains
 - Write arbitrary (fuzz) data in descriptor chains



Preparing Virtio Components for Fuzzing (2)

- Create a specialized mock for devices:
 - Balance between random data and useful data
 - Re-use mock for unit/integration tests





Reporting Security Vulnerability

- Find the appropriate security vulnerability process
- rust-vmm/\${name}/security/policy
 - https://github.com/rust-vmm/vm-virtio/security/policy
 - https://github.com/rust-vmm/vm-virtio/security/policy
- tl;dr: send encrypted email to rust-vmm maintainers





Apply security at all levels from project setup to development, and operation

Read code with a security hat on (and then write that threat model)

Use the security process for reporting vulnerabilities

