

KVM Forum 2020

# Intel TDX

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# Trust Domain Extensions

- Trust Domains
  - Hardware-isolated virtual machines
  - Provide memory and CPU state confidentiality and integrity
  - Maintain CSP control of resources and platform integrity
- Hardware + Software
  - VMX / ISA extensions
  - Memory Encryption w/ Integrity
  - CPU-attested software module
- In-Depth Presentation at Linux Security Summit
  - <https://sched.co/eCgM>




# Hardware

- Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM)
  - New architectural CPU mode
  - Enter/Exit via SEAMCALL /SEAMRET
    - Transition between VMX Root and SEAM Root
  - VTx supported in SEAM
    - Transition between SEAM Root and SEAM Non-Root
- Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption w/ Integrity (MKTME-i)
  - Integrity failures cause #MC (recoverable)
  - Partition Key IDs into shared and private
    - Private Key IDs can only be used in SEAM
    - Shared bit in GPA (bit 51 or 47) selects shared vs. private
- Shared EPTP
  - Second EPTP added to VMCS for shared memory management
  - Shared bit in GPA (bit 51 or 47) selects shared vs. private/secure

# Software

- Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) Module
  - Intel developed module that runs in SEAM
  - TDX-Module manages private guest state
    - Context switches register state, XSAVE state, MSR, etc...
    - Directly controls S-EPT, VMCS, etc...
    - Reflects instruction-based VM-Exits as #VEs
  - Exposes ABI to VMM to create Trust Domains (TD)
  - VMM manages resources, e.g. memory usage, scheduling, etc...
- SEAM Loader
  - Authenticated Code Module (ACM) that loads TDX-Module
    - TDX-Module protected via SEAM range register (SEAMRR)
  - Configures SEAM VMCS for SEAMCALL

# Overview



**TDX-Module flows (via TDCALL)**

VP.INFO
MEM.PAGE.ACCEPT
VP.VMCALL
MR.REPORT
...

**TDX-Module flows (via SEAMCALL)**

MNG.CREATE
MNG.KEY.CONFIG
MNG.ADDCX
MNG.INIT
VP.CREATE
VP.ADDCX
VP.INIT
MEM.SEPT.ADD
MEM.PAGE.ADD
MR.EXTEND
MR.FINALIZE
VP.ENTER
MEM.PAGE.AUG
MEM.RANGE.BLOCK
MEM.SEPT.REMOVE
MEM.PAGE.REMOVE
...

# Touchpoints

- Boot
  - Launch SEAM Loader ACM (BSP)
  - Configure TDX-Module (all CPUs)
- Core KVM
  - Wrap x86 ops callbacks to achieve VMX/TDX coexistence
    - No meaningful performance impact to VMX or SVM
  - Reuse select portions of VMX
    - IRQ/NMI handlers, Posted Interrupt support, EPT entry points, etc...
  - Moderate refactoring to x86 and common KVM
    - Piggyback and repurpose SEV's ioctls()
    - TDX-Module API ordering doesn't perfectly align with KVM
- MMU
  - Non-trivial KVM MMU changes to support S-EPT
  - Kernel MMU support to unmap guest private memory

# MMU

- Shared vs. Private Memory
  - Alias shared->private GPAs in memslots
    - Treat Shared bit as an attribute bit
    - Disallow shared bit in “real” memslot GPA
  - Hide shared bit from host userspace
    - Ignore/strip shared bit for emulated MMIO TDVMMCALLs
- Secure EPT (S-EPT)
  - MMU hooks to insert/zap/remove S-EPT entries
  - Maintain shadow copy of S-EPT tables
    - SEAMCALL is very expensive
    - Memory for page tables is relatively cheap
  - Additional API to create S-EPT translations without a page fault

# ...MMU

- Private Memory
  - Private memory must reside in a Trust Domain Memory Region (TDMR)
    - Kernel adds all RAM to TDMR array at boot
    - KVM allocates private memory as normal, “gifts” to TDX-Module / TD
    - HugeTLBFS, THP, memfd, anon, etc.... all supported
  - Unmap guest private memory (not yet implemented)
    - Prevent userspace from inducing integrity failures, i.e. #MCs
- EPT Violation #VE
  - Configure shared EPT to reflect emulated MMIO as #VE
  - #VE suppression is opt-out (non-zero init value for EPTes)
- Advanced Features (not yet implemented)
  - 2mb/1gb S-EPT large pages
  - Host page migration, e.g. NUMA balancing
  - Page promotion/demotion



# Status

- “Basic” Functionality
  - KVM code complete, QEMU functional
  - Kernel - 40+ files, 7,000+ insertions(+), ~700 deletions(-)
  - <https://github.com/intel/tdx> kvm
- Near Future (prior to upstreaming)
  - Large page support
  - Host page migration
  - Unmap guest private memory
- Less Near Future
  - Live Migration
  - Nested Virtualization

# Light Reading

<https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/articles/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html>

Thank You!