

Yandex Cloud

Virtio Device Fuzzing

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
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01

What is Fuzzing?


Fuzzing Technique: Part 1

black box, fuzz, test, crash




Fuzzing Technique: Part 2

grey box, coverage guided




Attack Surface




02

How We Added Fuzzing


Fuzzing Scheme




Real Fuzzing



AFL-Proxy Communication



Proxy-QEMU Communication



QEMU Status

code instrumentation




QEMU Status

persistent mode




Real Fuzzing




Input

Data?


Input



Input



Input



american fuzzy lop 2.52b (qemu-system-x86_64)

process timing

run time : 13 days, 6 hrs, 22 min, 28 sec
last new path : 6 days, 23 hrs, 38 min, 45 sec
last uniq crash : none seen yet
last uniq hang : 10 days, 7 hrs, 0 min, 20 sec

overall results

cycles done : **173k**
total paths : 142
uniq crashes : 0
uniq hangs : 1

cycle progress

now processing : 20* (14.08%)
paths timed out : 0 (0.00%)

map coverage

map density : 0.12% / 0.48%
count coverage : 1.82 bits/tuple

stage progress

now trying : splice 11
stage execs : 47/48 (97.92%)
total execs : 5.61G
exec speed : 5170/sec

findings in depth

favored paths : 21 (14.79%)
new edges on : 41 (28.87%)
total crashes : 0 (0 unique)
total tmouts : 9 (1 unique)

fuzzing strategy yields

bit flips : 19/328k, 2/328k, 2/327k
byte flips : 0/41.0k, 0/40.9k, 0/40.6k
arithmetics : 4/2.30M, 1/455k, 2/184k
known ints : 1/322k, 1/1.07M, 5/1.71M
dictionary : 0/0, 0/0, 0/1.91M
havoc : 38/2.18G, 11/3.42G
trim : 8.07%/6048, 0.00%

path geometry

levels : 7
pending : 0
pend fav : 0
own finds : 86
imported : n/a
stability : **26.98%**

[cpu000: **3%**]

03

Issues Found

VIRTIO assert (QEMU)

assert()

```
struct virtq_desc {
    le64 addr;          /* Address (guest-physical). */
    le32 len;          /* Length. */
    le16 flags;        /* The flags as indicated above. */
    le16 next;        /* Next field if flags & NEXT */
};
```

```
$ hexdump -C ./id0001.dump
00000000  40 e0 fd 3f 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 06 00 04 00  |..|
00000010  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |..|
```

SIGSEGV (SPDK)

memory access violation

```
struct virtq_desc {
    le64 addr;          /* Address (guest-physical). */
    le32 len;          /* Length. */
    le16 flags;        /* The flags as indicated above. */
    le16 next;         /* Next field if flags & NEXT */
};
```


```
# hexdump -C sigsegv.dump
00000000 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 00 01 00 |..|
00000010 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 10 00 03 00 02 00 |..|
00000020 40 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 02 00 03 00 |..|
00000030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |..|
```

CVE-2019-9547 (SPDK)

endless loop, DoS

```
struct virtq_desc {  
    le64 addr;          /* Address (guest-physical). */  
    le32 len;          /* Length. */  
    le16 flags;        /* The flags as indicated above. */  
    le16 next;         /* Next field if flags & NEXT */  
};
```

```
# hexdump -C hang01.dump  
00000000 b0 00 00 00 00 dd ff 80 00 00 00 00  
00000010 40 14 00 00 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
00000020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```



04

Future Improvements

Improvement Plans

1. Fuzz virtio-net, virtio-sock, virtio-*

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1. Fuzz virtio-net, virtio-sock, virtio-*
2. Fuzz PCI

Improvement Plans

1. Fuzz virtio-net, virtio-sock, virtio-*
2. Fuzz PCI
3. Enhance start corpus

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4. Update Qtest

Improvement Plans

1. Fuzz virtio-net, virtio-sock, virtio-*
2. Fuzz PCI
3. Enhance start corpus
4. Update Qtest
5. Verify test cases

05

Useful Links

Links

1. QEMU changes (afl-fuzz branch):

<https://github.com/yandex/qemu/tree/afl-fuzz>

2. AFL changes (qemu-fuzz branch):

<https://github.com/yandex/AFL/tree/qemu-fuzz>



Fuzz the Code for Fun and Profit!

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